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PROCEDURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKING
OF TRANSPARENCY IN ALGORITHMIC
PROCESSING OF RIGHTS*
by
RADIM POLČÁK**
Efficient  enforcement  of legal  substance  requires  proper  procedures  and capable
institutions.  In that  respect,  law  is  now  being  challenged  by the emergence
of automated systems that autonomously decide about matters concerning rights.
The neuralgic  point  in enforcement  of legal  compliance  of such  systems,  namely
with regards to possible discrimination, is transparency. Currently,  there exists,
at least  in the EU,  particular  individual  right  to know  the logic  of respective
algorithms.  The comment  tries  to narrow down the issue  of actual  enforceability
of that right by investigating its basic procedural and institutional aspects.
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1. CONGRUENCE BETWEEN OFFICIAL ACTION AND 
DECLARED RULE
The last, and by far not the least important, of Fuller’s principles of legality,
is about congruence of substance and administration of rights, or of “official
action  and  declared  rule”1.  All  substantively  grounded  rights,  however
compliant  with  the earlier  Fuller’s principles,  have  no  value  if there  are
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provided  inspiration  for  this  comment  thanks  to his  throughout  knowledge  of the work
of late Sir Terence Prachett.
** radim.polcak@law.muni.cz,  Head  of the Institute  of Law  and  Technology  at the Faculty
of Law, Masaryk University, The Czech Republic.
1 See Fuller, L. (1969) The Morality of Law. Yale University Press, p. 81.
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no means  available  for  their  actual  implementation.  This  principle
of congruence  of substance  and  procedure  is  being  often  materialised,
amongst  other  places,  at the European  Court  of Human  Rights  e.g. in cases
when it takes too long for the courts in the member states to deliver justice.2
Besides  cases  of inability  to deliver  justice  in reasonable  time,  there  is
a number of other possible cases of lack of congruence between substance
and  administration  of rights.  Despite  these  cases  originate  in hugely
different  domains,  they  all  arise  from  disproportions  between  the law
in books and the law in action which results in merely theoretical existence
of respective rights. In all these cases, illegality (in Fuller’s terms) arises from
rights being just virtual but not actual.3
Following are two examples that illustrate the aforementioned virtuality
of rights.  These  examples  are  in their  natures  very  close  to the below
research  questions,  because  they both relate  to the role  of state  in getting
complex information technologies under control.
The first example concerns data retention obligations that represent for
more  than  a decade  a mostly  controversial  issue  across  European
jurisdictions.4 Telecommunication  operators  have  in some  EU  member
states a duty to retain traffic data that are then available to law enforcement
and  security  institutions.  These  obligations  came  under  constitutional
scrutiny  across  the EU  and  elsewhere  namely  because  of concerns  over
privacy and personal data protection.
Regardless of whether traffic data are acquired by law enforcement upon
data  retention  obligations  or other  procedural  means,  their  availability
represents a conditio sine qua non for prosecution of certain types of crimes.5
Typically cyberstalking is quite impossible to prove without relevant traffic
data that show statistics and technical details of actions of the perpetrator.
If some jurisdiction  would not  allow access  to traffic  data,6 cyberstalking
would become a virtual  crime in the sense that this crime would be only
2 See  for  example  Edel,  F.  (2007)  The length  of civil  and  criminal  proceedings  in the case-law
of the European Court of Human Rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
3 For  the meaning  of “virtuality”  and  “actuality”,  see  Lévy,  P.  (2002)  Becoming  Virtual –
Reality in the Digital Age. Plenum Trade.
4 See  for  example  Boehm,  F.  and  Cole,  M.  D.  (2014)  Data  Retention  after  the Judgement
of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  EP Greens/EFA Group. Available  online from:
http://orbilu.uni.lu
5 See for example a U.S. Congress. (2011) Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Child
Pornography and Other Internet Crimes:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime,  Terrorism,
and  Homeland  Security  of the Committee  on the Judiciary,  House  of Representatives.  U.S.
Government Printing Office.
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theoretically present in criminal statutes but would never actually appear
in front of a court.
The second example is a case that involved  Google StreetView.  The FCC
investigated an allegation that Google used an algorithm that was skimming
the content,  including  highly  sensitive  personal  data,  from  wireless
networks in areas through which the StreetView cars  were roaming.7 FCC
was  only  able  to prove  that  Google  cars  were  sniffing  unsecured  Wi-Fi
networks,  while  there  was  lack  of evidence  that  the same was done also
to secured networks.8 Google was at the end fined USD25,000 for what David
Kravets named in Wired as “stonewalling the investigation”.9 
The obstacles for which  Google  was fined were quite far from morally
despicable.  They  can  be  simply  explained  as not  enough  willingness
of Google to incriminate itself.
Google was asked to provide  a copy of the actual  data that  it  collected
by sniffing wireless networks. In response, Google stated that
“it is not prudent or necessary for any governmental authority to examine
the communications  and  personal  information  of U.S.  citizens  in order
to resolve this matter”.10
Put aside the question as to what extent it was “prudent and necessary” for
Google to originally  gather  and  process  that  data  in the first  place,  what
matters more is rather that the FCC was not given that data at all.
If, hypothetically, more pressure was put on Google by the FCC,  Google
could have e.g. given the FCC all the data collected by StreetView cars in raw
format and asserted it possessed no means or motivation to interpret them.
In that case, the FCC would have been left with an endless amount of binary
data  and  a need  to find  someone  to interpret  them.  A second  option  for
6 It is to be noted here that some EU jurisdictions derogated the data retention duties, but
traffic  data  are  still  available  there  through  other  procedural  means  (typically  through
general  provisions  related  to stored  communications).  While  there  are  some  EU
jurisdictions  that  do  not  provide  for  a duty  to retain  traffic  data,  there  are  no  EU
jurisdictions where traffic data would not be used by law enforcement.
7 For analysis of this case, see Polcak, R. and Svantesson, D. (2017)  Information Sovereignty.
Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 170.
8 See the FCC Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture of 13 April 2012, File No EB-10-EH-
4055. It  is available  in an unredacted version from: http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/
threatlevel/2012/05/unredactedfccgoog.pdf
9 See  Kravets,  D.  (2012)  An Intentional  Mistake:  The Anatomy  of Google’s  Wi-Fi  Sniffing
Debacle.  Wired, 2  May.  [online]  Available  from:  https://www.wired.com/2012/05/google-
wifi-fcc-investigation/ [Accessed 5 September 2019].
10 See supra  FCC Notice, fn. 89 (this footnote was for some reason blacked out in a redacted
version that was later officially published by the FCC).
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Google would  be  to assert  that  “the communications  and  personal
information of U.S. citizens” had been deleted. The FCC would then either
have to believe it or to prove that such a statement was not truthful which
would  require  digging  the respective  data  from  somewhere.  The second
alternative is for obvious reasons rather unrealistic.11
Both  above  examples  demonstrate  clear  disproportion  between
legislated and administered rights.  First  case  shows a possible  normative
deficit when substantive provisions are not seconded with procedural rules
needed for enforcement of respective substance. Second case shows actual
practical (or institutional) deficit when procedural provisions do exist, but
technical complexity of respective matter makes it impossible to efficiently
use them and there is no way of normatively fixing it.
Lack of congruence between substance  and administration of rights  is
hugely present also in algorithmic administration of rights.12 The problem is
relatively  simple  here –  the lack  of normative  grounds,  the amount  and
relevance of technical obstacles,13 high costs, or all these factors at the same
time,14 prevent individuals as well as law enforcement from efficient review
of legal compliance of respective algorithms.15
The growing importance of this issue even provoked the establishment
of a research  group  within  the International  Academy  of Constitutional  Law
titled  Algorithmic  State,  Society  and  Market –  Constitutional  Dimensions.  Its
mission statement notes that
“[s]ince  information  and  data  are  the new  sources  of power
in the algorithmic society, patterns of market consolidation risk generating
technological  asymmetry  which  gravitates  to a handful  of multinational
private  players.  The state  then  finds  itself  in a peculiar  position,  as it
becomes partly dependent on the technologies of these players while vying
11 Lack of ability for a sovereign to exercise its powers is referred to in these regards by Healey
as “cyber-Somalia”.  See  Healey,  J.  (2011)  The spectrum  of National  Responsibility  for
Cyberattacks. The Brown Journal of World Affaires, 18 (1), p. 63.
12 The same  issue  is  tackled  from  a different  perspective  in Pasquale,  F.  (2017)  Toward
a Fourth  Law  of Robotics:  Preserving  Attribution,  Responsibility,  and  Explainability
in an Algorithmic Society. Ohio State Law Journal, 78, p. 1243.
13 For other issues in legitimacy (or legality)  of algorithmic administration of rights,  see for
example Gurumurthy, A. and Bharthur, D. (2018) Democracy and the Algorithmic Turn.
Sur – International Journal on Human Rights, 27, p. 39.
14 For  a detailed  analysis  of problematic  factors,  see  Bodo,  B.  et al.  (2017)  Tackling
the Algorithmic Control Crisis – The Technical, Legal,  and Ethical Challenges of Research
into Algorithmic Agents. Yale Journal of Law & Technology, 19, p. 133.
15 See Wolfe, A. (1990) Algorithmic Justice. Cardozo Law Review, 11, p. 1409.
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for a similar  position with respect  to the data  it  collects and analyses,  all
at the same time as it retains the power (and legal responsibility) to regulate
the industry and guarantee the protection of constitutional rights.”
Currently, there are two ways in which the law tries to normatively deal
with  this  issue –  either  through  transparency  of algorithms  or through
compulsory  human  review  of individual  algorithmic  decisions.
Transparency aims at making algorithm as such reviewable in order to find
our whether its code is in line with corresponding legal rules.16 The right for
a human  review  aims  at individual  confrontation  of a resulting  decision
rendered  by an algorithm  with  a human  assessment.  The difference
between  both  these  legal  tools  is  that  transparency  covers  congruence
in abstracto while  the right  for  human  review  lays  down  a congruence
review in concreto.
This  comment,  that  is  also  to accompany  a research  proposal
to the aforementioned research group, primarily focuses on the congruence
in abstracto,  i.e. transparency of algorithms.  In order to break this  complex
problem  down,  we  further  look  at two  of its  mostly  relevant  elements:
procedure and institutions. Our aim in this comment is not to resolve any
of these  two  issues,  but  rather  to identify  their  scope  and  name  their
neuralgic points. At first, we will briefly look at the right to know the logic
of rights-administering algorithms and try to define the question as to what
should that right mean in particular from procedural perspective. Secondly,
we  will  formulate  subsequent  research  question  as to who should
implement and enforce such procedure.
2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN COMPLIANCE REVIEW
The right  to know  the logic  of algorithmic  processing  of rights  is  already
laid  down  in some  countries –  e.g. in the EU  it  is  legislated  in Art. 12
in connection with  Recital 63 of the GDPR.  At first  sight,  this  right  seems
to serve  as a procedural  norm  that  deals  with  the issue  of transparency
of algorithms  and consequently  with  congruence  between substance  and
administration of algorithmically processed rights. 
However, the right to know the logic of algorithmic decisions does not
actually  represent  a norm  (or truly  a “right”)  but  rather  only  a general
16 See  Perel,  M.  and  Elkin-Koren,  N.  (2017)  Black  Box  Tinkering:  Beyond  Disclosure
in Algorithmic Enforcement. Florida Law Review, 69, p. 181.
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principle.  The scope of this right is so general that it  is utterly impossible
to directly  (i.e. through  syllogistic  application  upon  particular  facts)
transform  it  into  particular  rights  claimable  by individuals  who  were
affected  by algorithmic  decisions.  In other  words,  if someone’s  loan
application gets algorithmically  rejected and the rejected applicant  claims
the right to know the logic of respective algorithm, there is no way to imply
what exactly she is  entitled to get.17 If a court ruling would state e.g. that
the plaintiff  is  “entitled  to receive  information  on the logic  of processing
of her loan application”, nobody (including the defendant) would be able
to determine what should be done in order to comply.
One  might  understand  the transparency  right  in the way  that
the applicant  is  entitled  to receive  just  general  information  about  factors
that are taken into account by the algorithm. In that case, there is no way for
the applicant  or an independent  reviewer  to prove or even guess whether
the algorithm works in line with substantive laws (e.g. with laws that ban
discrimination). 
Another possible interpretation is that the applicant is entitled to receive
the actual  code  of the algorithm.  In that  case,  which  is  not  even  overly
probable due to legal constraints such as protection of copyrights or trade
secrets, the applicant would be provided with an actual computer code and
left  to her own regarding its  meanings – or provided with an explanation
of the code that she will be never able to verify against the actual code.
Third  option  is  that  the applicant  gets  an opportunity  to reversely
engineer  the algorithm  in the way  that  the algorithm  would  be  made
available  for  testing of inputs  and outputs.  Such testing might  then lead
to a sort  of recreation  of the way  in which  the algorithm  works.  Similar
to the previous  case,  finding  out  anything  useful  about  the actual  “logic
of processing” is quite impossible here if the applicant is a common person
and does  not  have  behind  her  an army of boffins  with  a supercomputer
technology.18
If we assume that the algorithm in question really lacks congruence with
substantive  rights,  e.g. by being  unreasonably  discriminatory,  a question
remains as to how it is actually possible to reach particular legally relevant
17 An attempt  regarding  clarification  of this  right  is  made  in part  dedicated  to Art. 12
of the GDPR in Kuner, C. Bygrave, L. and Docksey, C. (2019) The EU General Data Protection
Regulation – A Commentary. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
18 In addition,  the availability  of the algorithm  for  a reverse  engineering  would  not  give
the investigator a proper picture in case of autonomous systems – see infra.
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conclusion  about  such  lack  of congruence.  The problem  simply  is  that
the transparency requirement is so general that it has no practical meaning
in regular cases of complex or even autonomous algorithms.
3. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN COMPLIANCE REVIEW
The issue  of transparency  seems  a bit  easier  with  man-made  algorithms,
because  there  possibly  exists  some  “man”  who  ordered  coding  or even
directly  coded  respective  lack  of congruence  into  the algorithm.  Such
person should then be able under existing legal procedures to state such
lack  of congruence  in a legally  relevant  way  (e.g. as a witness  at court).
However, the probability of that happening in real life is quite the same as it
was with Google incriminating itself in the above Wi-Fi sniffing example.
Even worse from transparency perspective are cases when algorithms
are made autonomously with no direct human involvement, i.e. in the case
of neural  networks  or other  AI-based  systems  that  are  only  coded
by humans  to learn.19 The resulting  autonomously  generated algorithm is
in these  cases  unreadable  even  for  an army  of boffins.  If such  algorithm
unreasonably discriminates or does anything similarly unlawful, it might be
quite  impossible  even for  its  creator  to find  the core  of the problem,  not
even speaking about repairing it.20
Both above reasons are good enough for assuming that any other than
utterly  simple  algorithms  need  to be  legally  tackled  either  as black
or nearly-black  boxes.21 While  it  is  certainly  possible  to provide  for
normative  requirements  for  turning  black  in this  case  into  some  shade
of grey (such as those transparency requirements mentioned above), there
still  remains a question as to institutional  backing of such arrangements.22
19 See for example Lehr, D. and Ohm, P. (2017) Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars
Should Learn about Machine Learning. University of California, Davis, Law Review, 51, p. 653.
20 A good example is the recent row over the Tay chatbot. Despite being developed by one
of most advanced hi-tech corporations, Microsoft,  Tay was constantly tweeting hate speech
and nobody was able to fix that (so the only way for  Microsoft to deal with all the shame
was to simply switch Tay off). See Neff, G. and Nagz, P. (2016) Talking to Bots: Symbiotic
Agency and the Case of Tay. International Journal of Communication, 10, p. 4915. The selection
of most  hateful  autonomous  tweets  was  published  in Kleeman,  S.  (2016)  Here  Are
the Microsoft Twitter Bot’s Craziest Racist Rants. gizmodo.com, 24 March. [online] Available
from: https://gizmodo.com/here-are-the-microsoft-twitter-bot-s-craziest-racist-ra-1766820160
[Accessed 5 September 2019].
21 See  for  example  Bose,  U.  (2015)  The Black  Box  Solution  of Autonomous  Liability.
Washington University Law Review, 92, p. 1325.
22 The core  role  of institutional  component  of the rule  of law  represents  a defining  feature
of institutional  normativism.  For  a compendium  of this  methodological  approach,  see
McCormick, N. and Weinberger, O. (1986)  An Institutional Theory of Law – New Approaches
to Legal Positivism. D Riedel Publishing.
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In other  words,  one  question  is  to provide  for  normative  (or procedural)
possibility  of compliance  review  of algorithms,  while  the other  issue  is
to have institutions pragmatically capable of doing so.23
One  possible  approach  to the latter,  institutional,  issue  is  offered
in the work  of late  Sir  Terence  David  John  Pratchett.  His  ant-powered
computer24 later named Hex also looks, even to its creator,  Ponder Stibbons,
as a black box, because calculations do not only depend here on man-made
algorithms but mostly on behaviour of ants and, perhaps, also on complex
informational  effects  of an anthill.25 Pratchett paints  here  an institutional
model where Stibbons is given the authority to declare that the Hex is faulty
or broken  and  also  the authority  to adjust  or repair  it.  That  authority,
however, is not based on the assumption that Stibbons precisely knows what
is  happening  in the Hex,  but  because  he  is,  thanks  to his  intelligence,
experience, wisdom, moral profile and other personal properties, believed
being  capable  of properly  sensing  that  the  results  rendered  by Hex are
somewhat faulty.
The tricky element of this institutional arrangement is the required level
of explicit reasoning for  Stibbons to demonstrate a defect of the Hex as well
as the required level of explanation of what and why Stibbons does in order
to fix it. Terry Prachett puts it straight – Stibbons’ thinking is so complex that
it would not make sense for him to reason anything to anybody, because
nobody would be able to understand him anyway.
It is obviously not possible to implement in full  Sir Terence’s model for
identifying and fixing malfunctions in algorithmic processing of rights. One
reason  is  that  creators  of respective  systems  do  not  always  have  to be
as available and as capable as Ponder Stibbons. In addition, it is not entirely
in line  with  rule  of law  principles  to establish  control  or adjudicative
competence  only  upon  personal  properties  without  at least  a minimum
requirement  for  knowing  why,  how  and  what  is  being  done  with
the (allegedly) faulty machine.
At the same  time,  we  already  learned  that  relying  purely  on state-
-administered  law  enforcement  is  neither  economically  efficient  nor
23 See Baker, J. J.  (2018) Beyond the Information Age:  The Duty of Technology Competence
in the Algorithmic Society. South Carolina Law Review, 69, p. 557.
24 The first appearance of the Hex computer was in Pratchett’s novel Soul Music from 1994.
25 Pratchett does not mention that explicitly, but there is a good reason to believe that the Hex
in fact  uses fascinating complexity effects  described by Peter  Coveney and  Roger Highfield
in Coveney,  P.  and Highfield,  R.  (1996)  Frontiers  of Complexity. Penguin  Random House,
pp. 190–236.
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technically possible in regulatory areas with strong technological  aspect.26
Consequently,  we  now  witness  a massive  shift  in technologically
determined  areas  of law  from  state-administered  behavioural  rules
to performance-based rules that are autonomously developed by those who
are technically in charge (typically by service providers).27 This move from
state-ordered behaviour to state-ordered autonomous rulemaking has been
already successfully applied in cybersecurity or personal data protection.28
In that sense, it is inevitable to allow the Stibbons regulatory model into
areas such as algorithmic processing of rights not necessarily in its entirety,
but at least in part. It means at first  allowing and motivating an inclusion
into  the control  and adjustment  process  also  of those,  who might  not  be
officially  legitimised,  but  whose  technical  competences  and  experience
provide  for  reasonable  and  complex  understanding  of respective
technology.
Also,  it  seems  quite  appropriate  to admit  that  decisions  about  lack
of legal  compliance  of algorithms  will  not  always  have  to be  based
on perfect  logical  analysis  and accordingly  reasoned.  That  admittance  is
especially  problematic,  because  one might  say that  code is  a code and it
ultimately breaks down to simple logical instructions as to turning I into O
and vice versa. There is then no logical reason why a court or a similar body
should be unable to come with exhausting logical argumentation as to what
is  wrong  and  how  it  should  be  fixed.  The issue  of ipso  facto  limited
reviewability of decisions about lack of congruence of algorithms and laws
is therefore highly problematic.29
26 See Polcak, R. and Svantesson, D. (2017) Information Sovereignty. Edward Elgar Publishing,
p. 6.
27 For an explanation of nature and functioning of performance-based rules, see for example
Coglianese,  C.  (2017)  The Limits  of Performance-Based Regulation.  University  of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform, 50 (3), p. 525.
28 Statutory  examples  include  the Regulation  (EU)  2016/679  on the protection  of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) or Directive
(EU) 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level  of security of network and
information systems across the Union.
29 Similar  in nature  are  recent  cases  of security  concerns  over  certain  telecommunication
technologies –  these  concerns  are  often  well  grounded,  but  it  is  impossible  for  security
authorities to directly point to a particular threatening line of code or to a particular chip.
Media then tend to interpret these situations as allegations with no particular evidence.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
This comment looked at congruence between substance and administration
of algorithmically  processed  rights.  It  particularly  focused  on procedural
and institutional  backing  of assessment  of compliance  of algorithms  with
applicable  laws.  The purpose  of this  comment  was  to identify  particular
assignments for comparative constitutional research in this field.
The first identified research assignment is based on the assumption that
transparency requirement regarding algorithms is  so broad that it  covers
everything  and  nothing  at the same  time,  so there  is  a need  to formulate
at least  a bit  more  particular  procedural  right  (or rights).  If such  right
or rights  are  found  and  formulated,  they  may  be  used  either  directly
by being  implemented  into  the black-letter  law,  codes  of conduct  etc.
or indirectly  through  interpretation  of the existing  vastly  general
transparency requirements (such as those laid down currently in the GDPR)
by courts or other public authorities.
Second  particular  research  task  that  was  identified  in this  comment
relates to the extent to which particular  legal systems are able to swallow
a possible  shift  from  recent  standards  of input  and  output  legitimacy30
of authoritative  decisions31 in order  to provide  for  efficiency  of abstract
review of algorithms that administer rights. This task assumes that courts
and  other  legitimised  authorities  are  incapable  of properly  reviewing
complex algorithms.
Even if a technically capable body is found or established, it might not be
possible  in regular  cases  to logically  reason  why  some complex  (or even
autonomous)  algorithm  is  not  in line  with  rules  that  it  is  to administer.
Consequently,  there  is  a need  to tackle  the challenge  of a required  level
of reasoning  of legally  relevant  statements  (mostly  judgments,
administrative  decisions,  official  statements  etc.)  that  declare  lack
of congruence between an algorithm and applicable law.
30 For the meaning of the terms “input-” and “output legitimacy”, see for example Loth, M. A.
(2007)  Courts  in Search  of Legitimacy:  The Case  of Wrongful  Life.  In:  Sellers,  M.  (ed.).
Autonomy in the Law. Springer Netherlands, pp. 73–96.
31 For  a comprehensive  comparative  study  of such  standards  in the US  and  Europe,  see
De Lasser, M. (2009) Judicial deliberations: a comparative analysis of transparency and legitimacy.
Oxford University Press.
2019] R. Polčák: Procedural and Institutional Backing of Transparency ... 411
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] Baker,  J.  J.  (2018)  Beyond  the Information  Age:  The Duty  of Technology Competence
in the Algorithmic Society. South Carolina Law Review, 69.
[2] Bodo, B. et al. (2017) Tackling the Algorithmic Control Crisis – The Technical, Legal, and
Ethical Challenges of Research into Algorithmic Agents. Yale Journal of Law & Technology,
19.
[3] Boehm, F. and Cole, M. D. (2014)  Data Retention after the Judgement of the Court of Justice
of the European Union. EP Greens/EFA Group. Available online from: http://orbilu.uni.lu
[4] Bose, U. (2015) The Black Box Solution of Autonomous Liability.  Washington University
Law Review, 92.
[5] Coglianese, C. (2017) The Limits of Performance-Based Regulation. University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform, 50 (3).
[6] Coveney, P. and Highfield, R. (1996) Frontiers of Complexity. Penguin Random House.
[7] De Lasser,  M.  (2009)  Judicial  deliberations:  a comparative  analysis  of transparency  and
legitimacy. Oxford University Press.
[8] Edel,  F.  (2007)  The length  of civil  and  criminal  proceedings  in the case-law  of the European
Court of Human Rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
[9] Fuller, L. (1969) The Morality of Law. Yale University Press.
[10] Gurumurthy,  A. and Bharthur, D. (2018) Democracy and the Algorithmic Turn.  Sur –
International Journal on Human Rights, 27.
[11] Healey,  J.  (2011)  The spectrum of National Responsibility  for  Cyberattacks.  The Brown
Journal of World Affairs, 18 (1).
[12] Kleeman,  S.  (2016)  Here  Are  the Microsoft  Twitter  Bot’s  Craziest  Racist  Rants.
gizmodo.com, 24  March.  [online]  Available  from:  https://gizmodo.com/here-are-the-
microsoft-twitter-bot-s-craziest-racist-ra-1766820160 [Accessed 5 September 2019].
[13] Kravets,  D.  (2012)  An Intentional  Mistake:  The Anatomy  of Google’s  Wi-Fi  Sniffing
Debacle. Wired, 2 May. [online] Available from: https://www.wired.com/2012/05/google-
wifi-fcc-investigation/ [Accessed 5 September 2019].
[14] Kuner, C. Bygrave, L. and Docksey, C. (2019) The EU General Data Protection Regulation –
A Commentary. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
[15] Lehr, D. and Ohm, P. (2017) Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn
about Machine Learning. University of California, Davis, Law Review, 51.
[16] Lévy, P. (2002) Becoming Virtual – Reality in the Digital Age. Plenum Trade.
412 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 13:2
[17] Loth, M. A. (2007) Courts in Search of Legitimacy: The Case of Wrongful Life. In: Sellers,
M. (ed.). Autonomy in the Law. Amsterdam: Springer Netherlands.
[18] McCormick, N. and Weinberger, O. (1986) An Institutional Theory of Law – New Approaches
to Legal Positivism. D Riedel Publishing.
[19] Neff,  G.  and Nagz,  P.  (2016)  Talking to Bots:  Symbiotic  Agency and the Case of Tay.
International Journal of Communication, 10.
[20] Pasquale,  F.  (2017)  Toward  a Fourth  Law  of Robotics:  Preserving  Attribution,
Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society. Ohio State Law Journal, 78.
[21] Perel,  M.  and  Elkin-Koren,  N.  (2017)  Black  Box  Tinkering:  Beyond  Disclosure
in Algorithmic Enforcement. Florida Law Review, 69.
[22] Polcak, R. and Svantesson, D. (2017) Information Sovereignty. Edward Elgar Publishing.
[23] U.S. Congress. (2011)  Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Child Pornography
and  Other  Internet  Crimes:  Hearing  Before  the Subcommittee  on Crime,  Terrorism,  and
Homeland  Security  of the Committee  on the Judiciary,  House  of Representatives. U.S.
Government Printing Office. 
[24] Wolfe, A. (1990) Algorithmic Justice. Cardozo Law Review, 11.
